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Toward a Demarcation of Forms of Determinism1 
VLADIMÍR MARKO 
ABSTRACT: In the current philosophical literature, determinism is rarely defined explic-
itly. This paper attempts to show that there are in fact many forms of determinism, most 
of which are familiar, and that these can be differentiated according to their particular 
components. Recognizing the composite character of determinism is thus central to de-
marcating its various forms. 
KEYWORDS: Determinism – fatalism – logical determinism – scientific determinism – 
logical fatalism. 
 Determinism is a basic philosophical concept. It is usually assumed that 
both the term “determinism” and determinism as a philosophical concep-
tion or theory are clear and obvious. In the literature, however, the precise 
contours of determinism are not explicitly defined – an obscurity that often 
leads to inconsistencies and misunderstandings. 
 In this article, I put to the side questions concerning the soundness or 
adequacy of the philosophical views I shall consider. Instead, I am inter-
ested only in the basic conceptual contours of different kinds of determin-
ism and whether it is possible to sort them into some kind of interrelated 
order for the purposes of better demarcating varieties of determinism. My 
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main thesis consists of three claims: (i) there are many forms of determin-
ism; (ii) each form of determinism, as a philosophical conception, has a 
composite character; and (iii) conceptions of determinism can be differen-
tiated according to the particular elements used in their composition.  
 In what follows it is suggested that a) similar (or even the same) con-
ceptions of determinism may be designated by different names; and that b) 
various formulations labeled with the same name represent substantially 
different conceptions. Below I discuss different deterministic conceptions 
and emphasize some of their essential components that enable us to make 
their distinct features more vivid. 
1. The origin of the term 
 When philosophers wish to label a certain philosophical conception 
“deterministic”, they do not usually feel the need to additionally clarify 
or explicate what they mean. They simply take our understanding for 
granted. The meaning of this term varies, however, in both historical and 
contemporary texts.  
 “Determinism” has its origins in Latin. In Roman authors, we encounter 
use of “determino” or “determinatio”, which means “to enclose within 
boundaries, to bound; to limit, to prescribe, to determine; to fix, to settle”.2 
The Greek equivalent of the Latin determinare (syn. definire) is 
ἀφωρισμένης, which was used in approximately the same way. Ancient 
and medieval uses of these terms departed greatly from our use today. 
 Although philosophical conceptions of determinism have had their 
advocates throughout history, the specific term “determinism” arrived on 
the scene much more recently. A survey of Krug’s Allgemeines Hand-
wörterbuch reveals various uses of “Determinismus” (Bestimmung, Pre-
determinismus) and “die Deterministen” (see Krug 1827, vol. i, 500-501). 
Indeed, it contains a note on the first appearance of these terms (cf. Krug 
                                                          
2  Livy uses this as a technical term to describe the augurs’ division of the parts of 
heaven into regions (determinavit regiones) and for marking their boundaries [Liv. Ab 
urbe condita libri, i, 18, 7, 32]. A similar example can be found in Gellius [Att. n. 13, 
14]. In Cicero [Inv. 1, 52, 98], “the conclusion [i.e. peroration] brings to a close and 
delimits the whole oration (determinatio totius orationis)”. 
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1829, vol. v, 100), made by Christian Wilhelm Snell (1789) in a com-
mentary on Kant’s moral themes in Über Determinismus und moralische 
Freiheit. At several other places in the Allgemeines Handwörterbuch, de-
terminism is used in the sense of “philosophical necessity”. This use is 
related to an English source: Joseph Presley’s (1799; 1780) concept of 
“determination”; and Krug quotes John Presley’s correspondence with 
John Palmer (cf. Krug 1827, vol. iii, 128, 299, 303). A year after Snell 
(in 1790), Carl Friedrich Bahrdt in (1790, 291) also employs determinism 
as a theoretical concept. Soon after, the term appears in Kant’s treatise on 
religion (see Kant 1793). In a footnote, Kant considers determinism in 
the context of the opposition between agency and determination by ex-
ternal forces. Here, it is described as predeterminism, and it is ultimately 
rejected as an “illusion” (cf. Kant 1793, 58A). That same year, Heyden-
reich published his Über Freiheit und Determinismus (see Heydenreich 
1793). 
 Herbart uses the term once at the end of his text on Pestalozzi (1804, 
281) and several times subsequently (cf. Herbart 1842). He claims that de-
terminism is a prerequisite for action: “Determinismus ist Voraussetzung 
des Handelns” (Herbart 1843, 147; 152). Hegel (1816, ii, 206; 236) treated 
the term as a standard philosophical notion (in the context of mechanical 
processes, but also with respect to religion and freedom). An extensive rec-
ord of the term’s use in German can be found (with minor shortcomings) 
in the Deutsches Fremdwörterbuch (see Schulz et al. 1999, 442-443). Until 
the second part of the nineteenth century, the term was regularly used in 
the context of free will and its determination by antecedent circumstances, 
which were usually conceived as “external causes” that determine agents’ 
decisions in the traditional sense of a “causa finalis”. 
2. Early demarcations 
 In the opening pages of his Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern 
Physics, Ernst Cassirer dates the rebirth of determinism to 1872, the year 
in which Emil Du Bois-Reymond (1886, 107) held a public speech on the 
limits of our knowledge of nature (see Cassirer 1956). Du Bois-Reymond 
reflected on the Laplacean roots of the notion and attempted to revive a 
genuine philosophical conception of determinism in the sense of complete 
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physical causal determinism. In fact, he simply repeated the formulation 
from the key passage of Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. La-
place’s determinism, based on the principle of universal causal concate-
nation, was inspired by Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. In a fa-
mous passage, Laplace writes the following:  
We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past 
and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would 
know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items 
of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to 
submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the 
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest 
atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future 
just like the past would be present before its eyes. (Laplace 1902, 4) 
 This form of determinism identifies causation and lawfulness with de-
terminism. Laplace wants to say that predictability (p) must at least in prin-
ciple be grounded in the following postulation: There exists an intellect of 
some sort (i) that has access to and is able to analyze all relevant data (d) – 
where (d) consists of information about all forces (l) and all states (the po-
sition of all items at time t) in the system (s) – and that can bring this data 
under a single formula (f). In short, predictability (p) on this view is the 
result of the ability to apply a unique function (calculability) to the relevant 
data. In particular, Laplace highlights the following conditions for predict-
ability: p=⟨i, d, f⟩, where (d) consists of subset ⟨l, s, t⟩. 
 Laplace’s determinism is a philosophical conception, built from differ-
ent components. Central to it is the idea of a system governed by causation, 
which in turn proceeds according to laws. In addition, it relies on the notion 
of exceptional abilities (to obtain, analyze and calculate data via the appli-
cation of a function, on the basis of which to make predictions). The data 
consists of laws, states and time indices, where laws are understood as ac-
tive forces that are able to cause occurrences. 
 Cassirer (1956) pursued a different option and sought to distinguish be-
tween a new “critical” form of determinism and the old “metaphysical” de-
terminism. The former is based on the belief that causal relations and laws 
originate in the mind – i.e. their source is our experience, not nature itself. 
Natural laws apply not to objective things, as metaphysical determinism  
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conceives them, but to cognitions and their ordering. In this sense, causal 
relations have a necessarily epistemological foundation.3 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, William James (1907), mo-
tivated to make space for free will, also attempted to demarcate contempo-
rary conceptions of determinism. He identifies the old determinism with 
the following view: 
[P]arts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree 
what the other parts shall be … Any other future complement than the 
one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every 
part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in 
which there can be no equivocation or shadow of turning. (James 1907, 
150) 
 He calls this “old” conception “hard determinism”. Hard determinism 
does “not shrink from words like fatality, bondage of the will, necessita-
tion, and the like.” This contrasts with the “new” determinism – “soft de-
terminism” – according to which the following is true:  
Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, 
repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its 
real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and 
bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom. (James 1907, 149) 
3. Scientific determinism and scientific fatalism 
 Susanne Langer associates scientific forms of determinism with fatal-
ism (see Langer 1936, 474). Fatalism is seen as the outcome of a full-
fledged determinism. Determinism, which is based on the assumption that 
every event has an immediate cause, is a useful thesis for scientific pur-
                                                          
3  Cassirer (1956, 114): “We find the essential significance of the causal relation, if 
interpreted in a critical rather than a metaphysical sense, to be that it contains a state-
ment not immediately about things but about experience, by which and in virtue of 
which alone things, as objects of knowledge, can be given us. It expresses something 
about the content of empirical knowledge.” 
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poses. Problems arise, however, when this thesis is connected with predict-
ability, which leads to scientific fatalism. Modern scientific fatalism, ac-
cording to Langer, is “the assumption that there is a theoretically knowable 
collection of causes for any act”. The thesis is derivable, on this view, from 
the false assumption inherent in determinism (and illustrated via Laplace’s 
demon) of the ability to obtain knowledge of the “total state of the uni-
verse”. The assumption was thought by Russell & Whitehead (1910, 40) to 
involve an “illegitimate totality”, since “a whole cannot be theoretically 
constructed”; because of this, the doctrine of determinism in its philosoph-
ical form was taken to constitute “a modern version of belief in Fate” 
(Langer 1936, 478). Scientific fatalism is the view that there is a theoreti-
cally knowable collection of causes for any act (see Langer 1936, 478). 
Although “pure” determinism and fatalism commonly posit a causal con-
nection between the past and the future, such that the latter can be predicted 
on the basis of the former, they do not entail the predictability of the future, 
for causality does not necessary imply predictability. Even in the case of a 
completely causal universe, the unpredictability of human agency under-
mines general predictability, given the unknowability of human agency (cf. 
Langer 1936, 472). 
 Mario Bunge also views the idea “that causality is fatalistic” as mis-
taken and draws a distinction between scientific determinism and fatalistic 
determinism (going as far as to argue that the two are “incompatible”; see 
Bunge 1959, 101-102). His view on fatalism, causality and determinism 
differs slightly from Langer’s, however. While causal determinism is a 
theory that is grounded in reason and argument and offers “the means for 
knowing, predicting, and consequently changing the course of events”, 
fatalism assumes that a lawless, supernatural power (fate) drives our un-
knowable and inescapable destinies – a power that is above the law, 
works with unconditional necessity, and directs the course of events. 
Causality need not entail any such transcendental or supernatural agency. 
Moreover, it does not entail inevitability: causes can interfere with each 
other, background or hidden causes and conditions may obtain, human 
agency may intervene, and so on. Bunge inclines toward a conception 
known as agent-causation, according to which the presence of the ele-
ments listed above can result in different outcomes (which he interprets 
as a source of probability). Thus, “general determinism” need not be 
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viewed as holding unconditionally. It enables us to use our knowledge of 
laws to change or modify courses of events while leaving room for chance 
and freedom. In addition, Bunge firmly believes that statistical laws ex-
clude determinism completely and are indeed incompatible with it since 
they are based not on causal principles but on probability and generalized 
correlations obtained from data. As he puts this idea, “statistical law and 
probability destroys determinism”. 
4. Determinism in terms of predictability 
 Karl Popper, who prefers to interpret determinism as an epistemolog-
ical thesis, sums up the doctrine of scientific determinism (“the doctrine 
much stronger than common sense”) in his Open Universe. On his view, 
scientific determinism is a view with which “most physicists would have 
agreed at least prior to 1927” (Popper 1982, xx). According to scientific 
determinism, “the structure of the world is such that any event can be 
rationally predicted, with any desired degree of precision, if we are given 
a sufficiently precise description of past events, together with all the laws 
of nature” (Popper 1982, 1-2). 
 On Popper’s account, scientific determinism has its roots in “religious 
determinism” and seems to be “a kind of translation of religious deter-
minism into naturalistic and rationalistic terms” (Popper 1982, 6). It is 
contrasted with the metaphysical doctrine of determinism, which holds 
that  
[A]ll events in this world are fixed, or unalterable, or predetermined. It 
does not assert that they are known to anybody, or predictable by sci-
entific means. But it asserts that the future is as little changeable as is 
the past. Everybody knows what we mean when we say that the past 
cannot be changed. It is in precisely the same sense that the future can-
not be changed, according to metaphysical determinism. (Popper 1982, 
7) 
 Metaphysical determinism differs from scientific determinism. It is en-
tailed by both religious and scientific determinism. However, metaphysical 
determinism (along with metaphysical indeterminism) is not testable, since 
 T O W A R D  A  D E M A R C A T I O N  O F  F O R M S  O F  D E T E R M I N I S M  61 
it lacks empirical content. With regards to testability, another distinction 
drawn by Popper is that between a weak version of scientific determinism 
and its stronger form (cf. Popper 1982, 36ff).  
 The weak version presupposes the possibility of predicting any future 
instant of time in a closed physical system (“even from within”) “by de-
ducing the prediction from theories in conjunction with initial condi-
tions” (i.e. with knowable initial conditions). Theories here play the in-
strumental role of describing the world – asserting that it has certain prop-
erties. However, this does not mean that, if the theory that describes cer-
tain properties of the world is true, everything that can be deduced from 
it has a corresponding property in the world. This “stronger” kind of de-
terminism, criticized by Popper as false, subscribes to the predictability 
of “any given state, whether or not the system in question will ever be in 
this state” (Popper 1982, 37). Popper is not always consistent. This part 
of his book seems to identify determinism with causation (cf. Popper 
1982, 149), while in other places he asserts that they are different (cf. 
Popper 1982, 4, 19, 23). Although predictability contributes to the testa-
bility of scientific theories, Popper is critical of metaphysical and 
stronger forms of determinism.  
 Indeed, Popper is not alone in criticizing the conflation of determinism 
and predictability (see, e.g., Earman 1986, 9-10; Suppes 1993; Kellert 
1993; and Stone 1989). Predictability, which is just one component of (La-
placean) determinism, is an epistemological concept; determinism, on the 
other hand, should be analyzed as an ontic or physical thesis. Thus, it is 
necessary to distinguish determinism proper from determinism in the sense 
of the ability to make predictions. Patrick Suppes appeals to the three-body 
problem and Turing machine examples: both are illustrations of determin-
istic systems par excellence. As is well known, there is no algorithm (which 
could allow for prediction) for determining whether an arbitrary Turing 
machine in an arbitrary configuration will ever halt (see Suppes 1993, 245-
246). Suppes therefore insists on the conceptual separation of two notions: 
predictability and determinism. We have good reason to interpret certain 
systems as “deterministic” even though we may not be able to predict 
events occurring within it, which would suggest that determinism need not 
come hand in hand with the predictability thesis. 
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5. The rise of so-called “syntactical determinism” 
 Russell joins the discussion in his well-known lecture on the obscurity 
of the concept of a cause (see Russell 1917). On his view, the concept of 
determinism can be demystified by revealing its true nature – its standing 
as a functional relation: 
A system is said to be “deterministic” when, giving certain data, e1, 
e2, …, en at times t1 t2,…, tn respectively [viz. “determinants”], concern-
ing this system, if Et, is the state of the system at any time t, there is a 
functional relation of the form E1 = f (e1, t1, e2, t2, …, en, tn). 
 The system will be “deterministic throughout the given period” if t, 
in the above formula, may be any time within that period, though out-
side that period the formula may be no longer true. If the universe, as a 
whole, is such a system, determinism is true of the universe; if not, not. 
(Russell 1917, 199) 
Determinism in regard to the will … Whether this doctrine is true or 
false, is a mere question of fact; no a priori considerations (…) can exist 
on either side. (Russell 1917, 205).  
We were unable to find any a priori category involved: the existence of 
scientific laws appeared as a purely empirical fact, not necessarily uni-
versal, except in a trivial and scientifically useless form. (Russell 1917, 
208) 
 Russell thus insists on revising the concepts of cause and necessity – 
two fundamental elements of what had been the dominant approach to sci-
ence. Since “there is no a priori category of causality” – but merely certain 
observed uniformities (cf. Russell 1917, 205) – the notion of necessity is 
“a confused notion not legitimately deducible from determinism” (Russell 
1917, 207); it must be viewed simply as a logical necessity driven by con-
stitutive determinants as arguments of a necessary propositional function.  
 Although Russell turns away from the confused notions of cause and 
causality, his formulation leaves room for a connection between determin-
ism and predictability: a system is deterministic if its previous states deter-
mine its later states in the precise sense in which the arguments of a func-
tion determine its values. One of Russell’s important suggestions (which 
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concerns the traditional view that scientific laws hold absolutely) reflects 
“the principle of the irrelevance of time”: the fact that time, in an absolute 
sense, cannot enter into our formulae (see Russell 1917, 205). Our laws are 
not a priori principles that, because they have held for the past and present, 
will necessarily hold in the future. Our formulas are “methodological pre-
cepts”, not Laws of Nature that hold absolutely and eternally.  
 Russell was not completely satisfied with his formulation of determin-
ism. There are several reasons for this. For any set of data points that are 
describable by some function, those points are in fact describable in other 
ways, by infinitely many functions. Further, in dynamic systems, the past 
state of a system, to which a formula was hitherto applicable, may well 
change in the future, and what is selected as the simplest way to capture 
the facts may therefore change as well. In addition, the way our system 
has hitherto been described may advance, such that formulas we have 
thus far relied on no longer apply. For this reason, we must bear in mind 
the principle of the irrelevance of time.4 
 Russell’s revision seriously shook the traditional image of science 
held by the scientific community. As a result of his disruption, however, 
his critique of causation and natural laws made room for the concept of 
logical determinism. 
6. Schlick’s logical determinism 
 Russell’s observations provided the basis for a developing conception, 
which Moritz Schlick would later call logical determinism (the first use of 
this term). Schlick outlines this position as follows: 
Let us see how the scientist uses the word determination – then we shall 
find out what he means by it. When he says that the state E at the time 
                                                          
4  “In fact we might interpret the ‘uniformity of nature’ as meaning just this, that no 
scientific law involves the time as an argument, unless, of course, it is given in an inte-
grated form, in which case lapse of time, though not absolute time, may appear in our 
formulas” (Russell 1917, 205). An extension of Russell’s formula with regards to de-
terminism in dynamical or evolutive systems is given in van Fraassen (1989, 254). Rus-
sell’s function must be extended to cover all possible trajectories of the system, i.e. to 
encompass changes to successive states of the system.  
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t1 is determined by the state C at the time t0, he means that his differen-
tial equations (his Laws) enable him to calculate E, if C and the bound-
ary conditions are known to him. Determination therefore means Pos-
sibility of Calculation, and nothing else. (Schlick 1932, 114) 
 The “natural law” of science, however, “is not a prescription as to how 
something should behave, but a formula, a description of how something 
does in fact behave” (Schlick 1939, 147). Natural laws are just descriptions 
without any force, which do not make things to move according to their 
prescriptions. 
 The necessity of logical determinism is not the necessity of causal no-
mological determinism. It is the necessity of functional determination, 
which enables us, on the basis of a function and its determinants, to calcu-
late the necessary relational dependencies among determinants with re-
spect to the selected function.  
 Russell’s and Schlick’s formulations share a crucial assumption: namely 
that determinism is firmly linked with predictability (and, conversely, with 
the ability to make retrodictions). Schlick’s “possibility of calculation” cor-
responds to Laplace’s condition for making predictions (although Laplace 
had in mind a singular function over a complete universe). If one state of 
affairs is determined in the above functional sense, there is room for this 
state to be predicted (or to be calculated in advance) on the basis of 
knowledge of its previous states and the function that connects them to 
it. 
 Schlick’s calculability (predictability) is a form of deducibility. It rep-
resents a standard understanding of logical determinism according to 
which one state is propositionally connected to another state via inferen-
tial power. Logical necessity must be distinguished from physical neces-
sity and causation: “[W]hat is called causal necessity is absolutely differ-
ent from logical necessity […] [F]ormer philosophers […] frequently 
made the mistake of confusing the two and believing that the effect could 
be logically inferred from the cause” (Schlick 1932, 108). Schlick calls 
the relationship between logical principles and reality “a problem of log-
ical determinism” – or “a paradox” (see Schlick 1931, 159) – and locates 
its origin in Aristotle: “[T]he Principle of the Excluded Middle could not 
be applied to future events unless we assume the truth of Determinism.” 
Most likely with Jan Łukasiewicz in mind, Schlick adds that “there are 
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even modern logicians who follow him [viz. Aristotle] in this” (Schlick 
1932, 115). 
7. The bivalent nature of logical determinism 
 Jan Łukasiewicz’s formulation of determinism, developed more than a 
decade before Schlick’s, runs as follows: “By determinism I understand the 
belief that if A is b at instant t it is true at any instant earlier than t that A is 
b at instant t” (Łukasiewicz 1990, 113). On this formulation, the future 
must be treated like the past; it differs from the past “only in so far as it has 
not yet come to pass”. Everything is fixed in advance. The way out of de-
terminism consists in abandoning the beliefs that lead to a conception of 
eternal truth and the absence of free will.   
 Łukasiewicz offers two arguments against determinism. One is based 
on “logical principles”, while the other is based on “the principle of cau-
sality”. Here, I wish only to emphasize his commitment to the view that the 
bivalent nature of propositional calculus leads to determinism. This argu-
ment relies on identifying two principles: the principle of bivalence and the 
law of excluded middle. Even though the argument is ostensibly valid (on 
the basis of propositional calculus), it must be rejected for other reasons: 
“Although this solution appears to be logically valid, I do not regard it as 
entirely satisfactory, for it does not satisfy all my intuitions” (Łukasiewicz 
1990, 124).  
 The rejection of determinism “finds its justification both in life and in 
colloquial speech” (Łukasiewicz 1990, 125). The principle of bivalence is 
not applicable to future-oriented propositions that describe possible future 
(not yet generated) states of affair. Such propositions do not have “real cor-
relates” like propositions about the present and the past. A third, “neutral” 
value would be more appropriate to future contingents, and intermediate 
sentences would “ontologically have possibility as their correlate”. 
 The argument for determinism is logically valid. Thus, determinism is 
a self-consistent view; to the extent that it rests on the assumption of biva-
lence, however, not only is it unable to deal with future contingents but it 
also has unintuitive consequences with regards to human agency. 
 Friedrich Waismann uses the more expressive term “logical predestina-
tion” since, according to this conception, it seems “that indeed the entire 
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future is somehow fixed, logically preordained” (Waismann 1959, 
352). Following Waismann, Zbigniew Jordan interprets logical determin-
ism as the semantic formulation of strict determinism, “where the strict 
causal determinism implicitly assumes that an unending sequence of events 
has no limit” (Jordan 1963, 23). The principle of causality is not a neces-
sary consequence of the principle of bivalence, but it provides a firm con-
nection to real correlates, which secures the necessary truth of future prop-
ositions and justifies the thesis of eternal truth. In this sense, “strict deter-
minism” is the outcome of (a) the principle of bivalence and two additional 
assumptions: (b) the correspondence theory of truth and (c) the timeless-
ness or absolute character of truth (cf. Jordan 1963, 1). On Jordan’s view, 
“strict determinism” occupies the following relative place in the transitive 
chain of principal dependence: “If the principle of bivalence entails strict 
determinism and strict determinism entails fatalism, the principle of biva-
lence entails fatalism” (Jordan 1963, 3). In the same spirit, Jan Wołenski 
has recently interpreted logical determinism as a form of radical determin-
ism (see Wołenski 1996). 
8. Inevitability 
 The transitivity chain traced by Jordan led to the standard representation 
of logical determinism as logical fatalism. This conception finds support in 
Aristotle’s sea battle example and the case of future contingent proposi-
tions. Gilbert Ryle’s lecture “It Was to Be” (see Ryle 1953), Richard Tay-
lor’s articles and the widespread discussion that followed during the sixties 
(cf. Wallace 2011), A. J. Ayer’s “Fatalism” (see Ayer 1963) and Michael 
Dummett’s “Bringing About the Past” (see Dummett 1964) are among the 
many texts on fatalism that have contributed to this tradition. Logical ne-
cessity began to be more frequently interpreted in terms of inevitability.  
 Even though Raymond D. Bradley warned against the confusion of 
logical determinism with fatalism in the late fifties, the tradition of inter-
preting logical determinism as fatalism (or at least a kind of fatalism) 
continues. In “Must the Future Be What It Is Going to Be?”, Bradley 
restates some of Schlick’s earlier warnings to the effect that logical ne-
cessity must be distinguished from causal necessity and that the truth of 
logical propositions and their relations has a different character than the 
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truth of empirical evidence (see Bradley 1959). He criticizes the common 
assumption that logical determinism implies (logical) fatalism. On his 
view, what is timeless differs from what is empirical. The failure in this 
inference consists in ascribing logical necessity to causal necessity, and 
causal necessity to fatalism. We can accept as valid that if x is causally 
determined, then x is logically determinate. However, x’s being logically 
determinate does not imply that x is causally determined. These two 
claims are not equivalent; one concerns causality and the other concerns 
logical necessity. Three logical principles that are to be found in Aristo-
tle’s discussion of the sea battle – the law of identity, the law of noncon-
tradiction and the law of excluded middle – which form the crux of logi-
cal determinism, do not provide a sufficient basis for the projection of 
logical necessity onto causal necessity or the (actual) necessity of future 
truths. 
9. Logical fatalism 
 The term “(logical) fatalism” (a view according to which time is sym-
metrical and all possible worlds are reduced to the actual world) has, over 
time, completely replaced the term “(logical) determinism”. In his articu-
lation of what is referred to as the standard argument for (logical) fatalism, 
for example, Taylor nowhere mentions determinism, logical or otherwise 
(cf. Taylor 1962). Interestingly, laws are not mentioned anywhere in the 
first version of the argument. Instead, he emphasizes causes. He later sug-
gests that the only difference between the fatalist and the determinist is that 
the former explicitly holds that there is no difference between universal 
causation and inevitability. The distinction between fatalism (which claims 
that the future is unavoidable) and determinism (which relies on the causal 
assumption) seems superfluous. Fatalism as the claim that certain events 
are going to happen no matter what and regardless of their causes is, for 
Taylor, “enormously contrived”: “it would be hard to find in the whole 
history of thought a single fatalist, on that conception of it” (Taylor 1974, 
55). Fatalistic claims about unavoidability and deterministic claims about 
truth and necessity coincide and differ only with regards to the perspectives 
from which they are made. Like Taylor, Steven Cahn identifies fatalism 
with the thesis that: 
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[T]he laws of logic alone suffice to prove that no man has free will, 
suffice to prove that the only actions which a man can perform are the 
actions which he does, in fact, perform, and suffice to prove that a man 
can bring about only those events which do, in fact, occur and can pre-
vent only those events which do not, in fact, occur. (Cahn 1967, 8) 
 This attempt is supported by many authors. According to Peter van In-
wagen, for example, fatalism is “the thesis that it is a logical or conceptual 
truth that no one is able to act otherwise than he in fact does; that the very 
idea of an agent to whom alternative courses of action are open is self-con-
tradictory” (van Inwagen 1983, 23). Similarly, Paul Horwich describes fa-
talism as follows: 
What was true in the past logically determines what will be true in the 
future; therefore, since the past is over and done with and beyond our 
control, the future must also be beyond our control; consequently, there 
is no point in worrying, planning and taking pains to influence what will 
happen. (Horwich 1988, 29) 
 Finally, J. M. Fischer conceives of fatalism as “the doctrine that it is a 
logical or conceptual truth that no person is ever free to do otherwise” 
(Fischer 1989, 8). 
10. Determinism and fatalisms 
 Taylor is only partly correct when he writes that “it would be hard to 
find in the whole history of thought a single fatalist”, for there is a very 
reasonable sense in which we might hold that certain events are “unavoid-
able” even though they are not subject to strict causal necessity. In ancient 
texts, for example, we find a wide range of conceptions in which fate dif-
fers from necessity. Examples of this can be found in Cicero’s De fato and 
De divinatione (among other of his works). These different forms of an-
cient fatalism can be distinguished according to certain ‘topological points’. 
In the case of so-called event fatalism, future events are unavoidable in 
relation to either time, place, means (the way they are realized) or kind 
(arising from some necessary realization of disposition, etc.; cf. Marko 
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2011a; 2011b). In some cases, unavoidability hinges on the correlation be-
tween a sign and that which is signed, as in the Stoic example of the condi-
tional predictive sentence “If Fabius was born during the Dogstar, he will not 
die at sea,” where the relation between the antecedent state and the conse-
quent state is to be interpreted neither strictly causally nor via classical prop-
ositional implication but in terms of a certain sort of connectedness (e.g. in 
terms of relevant connection or a “responsibility” relation). 
 Since fatalism is not always about fixed points in time, in many cases it 
is not connected to the examination of causes, laws, logical laws, and the 
like. Many of these conceptions do not make room for the possibility of 
agency, as is the case with conditional fate. What ancient fatalisms have in 
common is that they generally concern truth in advance of a given happen-
ing – once in the past, it was true that at least one kind of entity (event, 
occurrence, disposition or truth of proposition) would inevitably be actual-
ized (in this or that way).  
 Although logical determinism (at least in Bradley’s sense) and logical 
fatalism (in Taylor’s or Cahn’s sense) seem to correspond to each other  
conceptually, they do not necessarily equally correspond to all forms of fa-
talism. Some forms of ancient fatalism correspond to, for example, John 
Earman’s naturalistic fatalism – the view that an event will occur in every 
physically possible world, “no matter what happens” – “for instance, that 
the laws of biology dictate that I am naturalistically fated to die”. Earman 
also claims, however, that “naturalistic fatalism in this sense neither entails 
nor is entailed by determinism” (Earman 1986, 18).  
 Susan Haack argues that theological fatalism (theological determinism) 
is an upgraded version of the argument for logical fatalism (see Haack 
1974). An additional proposition with theological content is added (for ex-
ample ‘God is omniscient’ or ‘God is omnipotent’) – one that is formally 
inessential to the proof. Since the logical premisses are independent of the-
ological content, the additional premise plays a superfluous role in the ar-
gument, a redundant detour from its logic. 
11. Nomological determinism 
 Several modern arguments for incompatibilism rely on explicit deter-
ministic assumptions (e.g. The Direct Argument and The Consequence  
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Argument – see van Inwagen 1983). In his exposition of determinism, van 
Inwagen (1983, 184-188) starts from the simple assumption that the past 
determines precisely one physically possible future. On his view, determin-
ism as a thesis about propositions need not be identified with determinism 
based on the principle of universal causation. He does not feel obliged to 
accept the principle of universal causation and doubts that this principle 
even entails determinism or that determinism entails causation (so there is 
still space for immanent causation despite the fact that in complex physical 
events it is an open question how and whether causation can be distin-
guished). Laws, however, are firm constraints that limit our abilities.  
 Van Inwagen understands a law of nature as “any set of worlds that has 
as a subset the set of all worlds in which the laws of nature are the same as 
those of the actual world, or, as we might say, are nomologically congruent 
with the actual world” (van Inwagen 1983, 65).  
 Determinism is presented as a conjunction of the following two the-
ses: 
For every instant of time, there is a proposition that expresses the state 
of the world at that instant. 
If p and q are any propositions that express the state of the world at 
some instants, then the conjunction of p with the laws of nature entails 
q.5 (van Inwagen 1983, 65) 
 Determinism consists in the antecedent conjunction of past truths (Po) 
and the laws of nature (L), while agency (A), is conditioned by that con-
junction [i.e. ((Po & L) → A)]. 
 In addition to this conception, according to which human agency is de-
termined by past truths and natural laws, we find a wide range of ap-
proaches that interpret this basis in a compatibilistic manner, allowing for 
agent-causation as an intervening link in the deterministic chain. The no-
tion of causality plays a central role here. Some compatibilists, continuing 
in the tradition of the “soft determinism” held by James, accept both causal 
determinism and logical determinism, while others do not fully accept ei-
ther the former or the latter. 
                                                          
5  Cf. also van Inwagen (1983, 58; and 2004, 344). 
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 Contrary to the above formulations from Schlick, the laws of nature 
used to be frequently understood and qualified as causes. The so-called on-
tic conception (cf. Salmon 1998, 54), widely accepted in scientific practice, 
claims that since laws are the explanatory engines of occurrences in the 
physical world, they can be interpreted as being responsible for occur-
rences: “laws of nature stand in no need of ‘philosophical analysis’; they 
ought to be posited as ontological bedrock” (Maudlin 2007, 1).  
 When we appeal to laws of nature, our starting point is the conviction that 
they are in some sense fundamental and cannot be reduced to other, more 
primitive notions. They are, we assume, basic ontological notions, since “our 
world is governed by laws”. In this sense, as Carl Hoefer puts it, a law is a 
cause “that makes things happen in a certain way” (Hoefer 2010). 
12. Determinism without laws and causation 
 Is it possible to represent determinism without laws? This depends on 
how we interpret laws. Some interpretations of laws of nature do not de-
pend on the notion of a cause. For example, Ernest Nagel’s syntactical for-
mulation of laws of nature conceives of them according to their logical 
function. On Nagel’s view, a set of laws is deterministic with regards to an 
isolated system of bodies, relative to a definite class of properties, if, given 
the state of that system at any initial time, those laws logically determine a 
unique state of that system for any other time (cf. Nagel 1999, 281).6 Laws 
are theoretical notions, and according to Nagel, “a theory is deterministic 
if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory 
logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other 
period” (Nagel 1999, 292). 
 If we wish to see the relation between two states as causally connected 
and thus to assume a causal version of determinism, this would seem to 
lead us toward ontological determinism. For this reason, Nagel insists 
that causality should be kept apart from determinism. Some authors pre-
                                                          
6  We find a similar opinion in Hempel: “a deterministic theory provides a system of 
laws which, given the state of an isolated system at one time, determine its state at any 
other time” (Hempel 1962, 107). 
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fer to keep causality in their accounts of determinism as “a pure theoret-
ical notion” – a useful concept that has indubitable explanatory ad-
vantages (cf. Tooley 1987, Chap. 9). 
13. Deterministic theory and possible worlds 
 A more precise definition – one that may partly avoid the above diffi-
culties – comes from Richard Montague (see Montague 1974; later slightly 
reformulated by Earman 1986, 12-14). Montague develops Nagel’s (1953) 
earlier formulations. His idea is that determinism can be seen as a property 
of theories. Briefly, a theory is interpreted by a formal semantics approach 
and is associated with a class of models. The objects of a theory are repre-
sented as systems, properties are states, and regularities can be represented 
as functions that ascribe a value to some point on the t axis (and can be 
interpreted as “the laws of the theory”). Thus a theory T is deterministic if 
any of at least two possible histories (S and S’) that realize (satisfy – Rl)7 T 
and which are identical at a given time t0 are identical at all times t. T is 
deterministic if and only if all models of that theory that agree on the state 
of the world at one time also agree at certain other times.  
 Let us suppose that S is a history, where S = ⟨D1, …, Dn⟩ and where D 
is one argument function defined at least for all real numbers R, and that 
the state of S at t (stS(t)) is defined as stS(t) = ⟨D1(t),…, Dn(t)⟩. Then,  
 a theory is historically determined: 
   If S, S′ ∈ Rl(T), t0, t ∈ R, t0 < t, and stS(t0) = stS′(t0),  
then stS(t) = stS′(t); 
 a theory is futuristically determined: 
   If S, S′ ∈ Rl(T), t0, t ∈ R, t < t0, and stS(t0) = stS′(t0),  
then stS(t) = stS′(t). 
                                                          
7  A formula ϕ of L is realized by a history S (i.e. Rl) just in case there is a standard 
model M of language L such that history S is a partial model corresponding to  
M(S = Pm(M)) and formula ϕ is true in model M. S realizes a class of formulas or theory 
K (in symbols, S ∈ Rl(K)) if there is a single standard model M such that S = Pm(M) 
and theory K holds in model M. 
 T O W A R D  A  D E M A R C A T I O N  O F  F O R M S  O F  D E T E R M I N I S M  73 
 A theory is deterministic if it is both historically determined and futur-
istically determined. That is: 
 If S, S′ ∈ Rl(T), t0, t ∈ R, and stS(t0) = stS′(t0) then stS(t) = stS′(t). 
 Earman interprets Montague’s formulations in terms of physically pos-
sible worlds. Earman’s modification of Montague allows for additional al-
ternative approaches and different modes, where determinism can be inter-
preted not only as a property of the theory but also as a property of, for 
example, the set of laws, the world, the actual state of the universe (where 
the history is settled by the laws even though they do not determine future 
states of the universe), and so on. 
14. Deterministic systems 
 Russell’s observation concerning the principle of the irrelevance of 
time suggests an attempt to define determinism in a changing system in 
terms of actual trajectories alone rather than possible trajectories (which 
could be infinite in number and must be avoided). According to Monta-
gue, this approach will preclude the deterministic condition that a given 
state is always followed by the same history of state transition. Taking 
determinism as a modal notion, Bas van Fraassen tries to refine Russell’s 
formulation, taking into account not only actual but also possible trajec-
tories. On his view, a system is deterministic if two possible worlds have 
the same history of state transitions: “If u and v are possible histories, and 
u(t) = v(t′) then for all positive numbers b, u(t + b) = v(t′ + b)” (van Fraas-
sen 1989, 254). 
 Mark Stone (see Stone 1989) and Stephen Kellert (see Kellert 1993), 
via an analysis of Laplacean determinism, attempt to identify and extract 
key properties of determinism, which can serve as necessary and sufficient 
conditions for determinism: 
 a) there exists an algorithm which relates a state of the system at any 
given time to a state at any other time, and the algorithm is not 
probabilistic;  
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 b) the system is such that a given state is always followed by the same 
history of state transitions;  
 c) any state of the system can be described with arbitrarily small (non-
zero) error (cf. Stone 1989, 125). 
On this view, determinism is a necessary condition for predictability, but 
not vice versa.  
 Stone, Clark (1989) and Kellert extend deterministic interpretation 
from linear to non-linear systems (systems usually interpreted as not fully 
stable or not transforming continually because they are affected by occa-
sional “jumps”). These systems are deterministic, although they are only 
globally, not locally, predictable. Their defining feature is that, even 
though they behave chaotically, they periodically jump into patterned 
(deterministic) behavior: Although movements in these systems are char-
acterized by infinite possibility, they oscillate within steady and predict-
able macro patterns. The chaotic behavior of the system is due to epis-
temic considerations (or to the lack of Laplacean “demonic” abilities on 
the part of the observer) with respect to computability and our inability 
to give precise initial conditions. Determinism is here accepted as an ex-
planatory tool because some aspects of a system’s evolution are coverable 
(not statistically or probabilistically, but) by strictly deterministic differ-
ential equations that allow for the “predictability of higher order charac-
teristics” with respect to certain deterministic aspects of the system (re-
lated, for example, to its qualitative or topological character – cf. Kellert 
1993, 56-57). 
 Deterministic properties can also be analyzed within the scope of 
quantum theory, especially quantum field theory. Some recent results 
support the thesis that quantum theory can also be interpreted as deter-
ministic and that such an interpretation is entirely coherent (see Butter-
field 2005). 
15. The components of determinism 
 As we have seen in the previous sections, there are many forms of de-
terminism and fatalism. I have referred to more than twenty different terms 
related somehow to these kinds of conceptions. Obviously, the list is far 
 T O W A R D  A  D E M A R C A T I O N  O F  F O R M S  O F  D E T E R M I N I S M  75 
from being exhaustive – it represents only a selection, here reduced to those 
conceptions that are in some sense dominant or frequently discussed in 
modern philosophy. In philosophy as well as in other disciplines (from a 
computer programming to economy), we could easily find other labels with 
some specific designations useful for a given discipline. Moreover, other 
expressions are frequently used to point out quite specific circumstances. 
For example, consider the term “fatalism” as it is nowadays used in medi-
cine or psychology: An event, with respect to a patient’s conditions, is un-
avoidable regardless of any treatment (or no treatment at all) – the event in 
question is related to some future fixed point irrespective of a way to be 
reached. It corresponds to the conception characterized here as event-fatal-
ism or to Earman’s naturalistic fatalism (“which neither entails nor is en-
tailed by determinism” and it presents conception that has a very little in 
common with other forms of fatalism, either in a sense of scientific or log-
ical fatalism). 
 Given the distinctions discussed so far, it is easy to find out that 
 a) similar (or even the same) conceptions of determinism may be des-
ignated by different names; 
and that 
 b) various formulations labeled with the same name represent sub-
stantially different conceptions.  
For example: a) deterministic conceptions in a sense of Russell’s functional 
determinism, Montague’s syntactical determinism, Nagel’s nomological 
determinism (and, mostly, Popper’s weak version of scientific determin-
ism) have many elements in common. The same case is with a strong ver-
sion of scientific determinism characterized by Popper and scientific fatal-
ism sketched in Langer. Moreover, the terms like logical predestination, 
strict determinism, radical determinism, fatalism, etc., frequently refer to 
the same conception. From the other side, b) the metaphysical determinism 
is differently characterized by Łukasiewicz and Popper and these two are 
conceptually different. In addition, there are some vivid differences among 
the conceptions of logical determinism as characterized by Schlick, 
Waismann, Jordan, Wołenski, Bradley, Taylor and Cahn. In literature, these 
conceptions are frequently referred to by the same name. The discussion on 
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fatalism is alike – logical or scientific, naturalistic or event-fatalistic con-
ceptions do not always coincide conceptually, since they do not share the 
same components. The component of ceaselessness, that is a substantial 
part of determinism, is not a necessary component of all forms of fatalism. 
All these cases witness a need for a more appropriate way for demarcating 
these conceptions. 
 As we have seen, the term “determinism” has been used in a very broad 
way to capture specific ideas and concepts that are conflicting and even mu-
tually exclusive. The demarcation of different forms of determinism might 
well offer a solution – given an emphasis on their substantial differences. 
Since the conceptions discussed so far are complex, their differences (and 
varieties) can be elucidated via a matrix of some essential or fundamental 
properties (or their absence). 
 I suggest moving towards a classification of different forms of deter-
minism from bottom-up rather than via a simple (theoretically heteroge-
neous) typology. Such a classificatory project would provide a more ap-
propriate demarcation. It would enhance our understanding of the deter-
minism’s sub-forms and promote further research on the subject. Further-
more, a sorting of distinct forms of determinism that focuses on the mu-
tual dependency of their components would offer an informative insight 
into the nature of these components. Simple typology only provides us 
with distinctions motivated by certain dominant properties. However, it 
cannot provide us with a satisfying picture of the mutual dependencies 
among singular types. For this reason, the search for a minimal common 
denominator of different forms of determinism is a worthwhile direction 
of inquiry.  
 It seems that this basic level must consist in the notion of “functional 
determination”, for this represents the common core of all further elabora-
tions. This core layer comprises only the simple “order” of variables and it 
is free of excessive additional features, such as, for example, a kind of re-
lation (or nature of impact) among the entities or temporal character of di-
rection (which is introduced when we refer to “state plus time (of occur-
rence)”). Such a characterization can preserve the basic order of entities, 
and it guarantees that entities are sorted according to a linear function. This 
core level, which involves only transitivity and continuity (i.e. ceaseless-
ness), can serve as a basis for further developments of determinism, such 
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as those discussed by philosophers today. In addition, this feature enables 
opposition to ceased character of indeterminism. This basic level can be 
compared to John McTaggart’s idea of a “flat” series of time, or a C-series 
(cf. Mc Taggart 1908, 462). It need not be understood as determinism itself; 
rather, it serves as a basis for the development of different forms of deter-
minism. 
 If we add to this basic level a further conceptual component – the uni-
versal principle of causation – we get causal determinism. Further, by add-
ing to this composition of causal determinism yet another element – “the 
laws of nature” – we have nomological causal determinism (the most ap-
propriate with Laplace’s view). If we omit the principle of causality but 
retain the laws of nature, we come to nomological determinism. As we have 
already seen, some forms of nomological determinism are advocated by 
Russell (who conceives of laws as functions), Nagel, Schlick and Monta-
gue (who construe laws as functions alike but with an additional emphasize 
on the role of the laws of thought). A form of nomological determinism is 
also present in van Inwagen’s conception (with an additional claim that 
laws of nature are nomologically congruent with the actual world and that 
the real world inevitability can be understood as or related to a logical ne-
cessity). If we think of Salmon’s, Maudlin’s and Hoefer’s conception as 
alike in their claiming that laws are responsible for occurrences and play 
the role of causes, then these conceptions will interfere with nomological 
causal determinism, too. 
 If we step back to the basic level and add both the principle of causa-
tion and the so-called “Aristotelian laws of thought” (the principles of 
non-contradiction, excluded middle and identity), this brings us to a form 
of logical determinism criticized by Jordan. If we enrich this new com-
position of the principle of correspondence (correspondence to so-called 
“real correlates”), then we obtain a metaphysical version of logical deter-
minism which Łukasiewicz had in mind in his criticism of determinism. 
Other forms of determinism can be composed in a similar manner, with 
the basic lower layer amounting to a core that contains the minimal fea-
tures of transitivity and continuity (ceaselessness) – the latter property 
serving as a component which is necessary both for the principle of cau-
sality and for the laws of nature (as well as for functions that serve as 
their substituents).  
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 Another recommendation concerns the possibility of a minimal formu-
lation of fatalism – one that has the essential property held in common by 
the above-listed forms of fatalism: inevitability. The minimal conditions 
for determinism obviously differ from the minimal conditions for fatalism. 
Inevitability is not a part of the minimal deterministic core (at least, as we 
saw above, it is not necessarily related to ceaselessness). So, it is possible 
to develop a minimal core of fatalism in accordance with the traditional 
forms mentioned above. However, it is also possible for these two core 
layers to intersect at a higher level. Such an intersection would require fur-
ther additional assumptions related to causal, nomological or other specific 
properties. Some forms of the so-called logical fatalism can include layers 
that also belong to some forms of determinism – by reading implication 
causally or by interpreting inevitability as logical (or functional or lawful) 
necessity. The term “logical fatalism”, usually used as a unique extension 
of logical determinism, may also be appropriate in case it includes, for in-
stance, the principle of causality together with the laws of thought, and if 
it identifies necessity with inevitability. According to Jordan (contra Brad-
ley), logical determinism (equipped with the principle of causality and the 
laws of thought, especially with the law of excluded middle identified 
with the principle of bivalence) leads to fatalistic inevitability. Taylor’s 
formulation of fatalism also accepts causes and in the later versions he 
identifies universal causality with inevitability. However, the conception 
that accepts only the laws of thought but omits the principle of causality 
– frequently referred to as logical determinism – is not necessarily based 
on minimal core needed for determinism (i.e. ceaselessness). Bradley 
used to characterize such conception as timeless and Jordan relates it to 
timeless truths. The conception is considered by Ayer, Cahn, Ryle, Dum-
mett and discussed under the term “fatalism” also by van Inwagen and 
Fischer. 
 Now it can be seen that if we take into account only some of the domi-
nant components of the above mentioned conceptions and their combina-
tions, we are able to recognize their common features and point to some 
basic differences between them. Let me illustrate these differences with the 
following table. Although incomplete, it includes the most fundamental com-
ponents. Here, the names of particular conceptions are given temporarily and 
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causal determinism* +  +    
nomological causal determinism* +  + +   
nomological determinism* +   +   
(functional) nomological determinism* +    +  
logical determinism* +  +   + 
Taylor’s “fatalism”* + + +   + 
(genuine) fatalism*  +     
logical fatalism*  +    + 
 With both determinism and fatalism, we are able to supply other fea-
tures as building blocks (giving rise to further conceptions): time compo-
nent (character of time, temporal direction, time symmetry or asymmetry), 
causality, logical, physical, epistemic or other properties (laws of nature, 
statistical laws, probabilistic laws, linear or nonlinear changes to the sys-
tem, etc.). Adding any of these distinct elements results in still further dis-
tinct philosophical conceptions. 
 What I have tried to show above is that these combinations stem from 
more elementary layers that must be further investigated as the composite 
elements of complex conceptual structures. Each of these combinations, no 
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matter how far they resemble other compounds, has its own meaning and 
leads to a different philosophical and conceptual standpoint. My primary 
interest in this paper was not to provide an exhaustive, systematic list of 
the various forms of determinism on offer but rather to draw attention to 
the fact that determinism is not a unitary philosophical conception as it is 
frequently used in the literature. I have outlined traditional and modern 
philosophical approaches to determinism and have provided a sketch of the 
means by which we might achieve a deeper understanding of their contours 
and points of intersection. The forms of determinism outlined above are 
composite in character. Reducing them to their more elementary building 
blocks helps us to better understand their composite conceptual structures. 
A deeper understanding of these elements is crucial to our ability to assess 
the theoretical consistency and sustainability of particular conceptions of 
determinism. 
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